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The Palestinian people have lived under numerous imperial rulers; first, the Ottoman 
Empire, then later the British. Today they live under the military occupation of the state of Israel 
as second class citizen  millions more living abroad as refugees. Young Palestinian men have 
become the leaders and the physical manifestation of the struggle against Israel, a political 
Goliath that has used tactics to repress the Palestinians such as, detentions, beatings, and land 
confiscation, which many outside of the Israeli state deem as illegal. Scholar Rashid Khalidi 
states that “the quintessential Palestinian experience, which illustrates some of the most basic 
issues raised by Palestinian identity, takes place at the border[...] in short, at any one of those 
many modern barriers where identities are checked and verified”(Khalidi, 1997:1). It is through 
this process that the battered and bruised body of young Palestinian men represents the political 
identity of Palestinians to people all over the world. Yet the meaning of this body has 
transformed generation to generation. This paper analyzes not only this generational shift but 
also the history of this symbol. In this effort it also addresses related ideas, such as colonialism, 
nationalism and identity in the context of modern Palestine. Additional elements include issues 
such as state sanctioned violence and the impact this violence  has on the mental development of 
identity in those Palestinian men who grow up under Israeli military occupation. Above all else, 
this paper explores Palestinian male identities, and their responses to the question  “Who am I?”, 







Chapter 1- Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction to Palestinian Identity 
Forming one’s identity is an issue centered on the individual level, an internal battle of 
finding the answer to the question “Who am I?” However, identity is not something that is fully 
decided by an individual alone, though it exists within individuals. As scholar Edward Said notes 
in his renowned work ​Orientalism​ ,​ ​ “the development and maintenance of every culture requires 
the existence of another, different and competing ​alter ego”(​ Said, 1994:331-332). This means 
that a person is not able to establish his own identity without being fully engaged with another. 
Identity formation also manifests within the context of  international conflict. 
 Take the following scenario for example. Group A has been living in a specific region 
for centuries and is ruled by Group B. Group B believes that the people of Group A are not 
capable of governing themselves since  they were ruled over by another empire for centuries 
prior, though members of Group A were politically engaged during this time. For years Group A 
scrambled to create an identity of their own in order to rule themselves and to show Group B that 
they can govern themselves. Yet Group A’s struggles were to no avail because Group B barred 
them from representing themselves politically. Finally, it becomes evident that Group B has no 
intention of letting Group A become autonomous. Group B gives Group C the land that Group A 
has been living on. War breaks out. Group A is forced from their homes while Group C totally 
erases any trace of Group A from the land. Hundreds of thousands of people from Group A are 
forced to leave their homes while others began living under the occupation of Group C. 
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Normally Group B would be against what Group C was doing to Group A being that Group B 
was known for publically proclaiming support for  human rights; however Group B decides not 
to get involved. Group A subsequently is victimized by Group C for decades thereafter. As the 
years went on, Group A is subjected to state-sanctioned violence, land confiscation, and political 
repression. Group A tries to fight back but Group C makes it difficult. Group C targets young 
men and boys in order to continue the process of erasing the existence of Group A. Finally, 
Group A decides to come together and build a political group to combat Group C. However 
Group A’s struggle is not recognized by Group B and others who turn a blind eye to what Group 
C is doing to Group A. Group A has continues their efforts to establish a local, regional, and 
global identity. The young men of Group A in particular take the brunt of violence perpetuated 
by Group C using their bodies.  In doing so they become a physical manifestation of Group A in 
their entirety. This identity becomes one of sacrifice, victimhood, and martyrdom but manifests 
differently from generation to generation; the overall theme of their collective identity remains 
constant. Group A, particularly their young men, have fought against the powerful state of Group 
C for decades. Group A went from having no separate identity, to scrambling to find one, to 
finding one in the midst of catastrophe.  
When reading this scenario one might immediately sympathize with Group A. They are a 
group of people who were never allowed to govern themselves due to imperial and colonial 
rulers. Finally, Group C comes into the picture in a way, from Group A’s, perspective is illegal. 
They enter the state violently with the intent to erase any mention of Group A in the history of 
the new state. Group C accomplishes this by using neo-colonial methods and state sanctioned 
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violence, which politicizes the young men of Group A. This narrative sounds like a David and 
Goliath-esque fairytale that is just waiting for a conclusion to be written. However this is not 
fairytale, this is a reality. This is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
This narrative not only illustrates the struggle of the Palestinians but also mirrors other 
movements in history such as the Civil Rights movement in America in the 1960s that has now 
transformed into the movement for Black Lives This narrative also echoes in modern day 
conflicts involving Syrian refugees, ISIS, and the Western world. Despite the similarities the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict takes center stage over any other. Though the reasons underlying this 
are debatable, the facts on the ground and the influences of the media attention, are not. 
This paper focuses on the way this conflict is fueled by conflicting identity narratives. 
More specifically I will examine the political identity of young Palestinian men and how this 
identity has developed and transformed from 1948 to today. While the collective Israeli identity 
is also obviously important to the core of this conflict, it will not be a central focus of this paper. 
Israeli identity will be primarily analyzed within the context that one identity- i.e. the Palestinian 
identity- cannot be developed without the clashing of an opposing identity (Khalidi, 1997). 
 The political identity of Palestinian men has developed in a unique fashion due to a three 
core variables: the history surrounding the conflict, which includes colonialism and imperialism; 
the fact that this conflict is being fought in and through the bodies of young Palestinian men; and 
there have been generational shifts in the development of Palestinian political identities. The 
Palestinian political identity manifests physically form the meaning and importance of this form 
has morphed from one generation to the next. However the main aspect of the physical 
 
10 Dayyat 
representations of this identity has remained the same: a beaten and battered body of a young 
Palestinian man who has sacrificed his body on behalf of Palestinian nationalism with its goal to 
achieve a free Palestine.  
Since the events of 1948, which became known as ​Al Nakba ​ (the catastrophe to the 
Palestinians)​,​  Palestinians generally and Palestinian men particularly have only known violence; 
more often than not, illegally imposed detention and torture carried out by of the Israeli state. 
Rooted in this violence is a constant tension that pervades any sort of interaction between the two 
communal groups. While this is largely seen and recognized by the international community as a 
grave injustice toward the Palestinian people, many global powers have done nothing to formally 
recognize Palestinian national identity or rights due to the fact it has “at different times [been] 
perceived [...] as a threat to their interests” (Khalidi, 22: 1997). Without the backing of 
international superpowers like the United States and the United Kingdom, Palestinians, 
especially men, have been forced to suffer, lacking much needed international, national, and 
local aid and support. These violent incidents and detentions are only small examples of what 
Palestinian men must deal with daily in interacting with Israel and its state actors. Beatings, 
shootings, arrests, and torture are among the primary actions perpetrated against Palestinian men, 
defining who they are. Many of what the state of Israel and its collective identity does to define 
the opposing identity of Palestinian men has been deemed illegal by outside international groups. 
Torture for example was declared illegal by the international community with the ratification of 
the ​Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment​  in 
December of 1984 and was later entered into force in 1987 (which happened to be during the 
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time frame of one of the largest civil disobedience demonstrations in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflicts history, the ​First Intifada.​ ) According to this convention, torture is defined as: 
[...]any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent 
in or incidental to lawful sanctions (CAT,1984). 
 
Disregarding infractions that occurred prior to the ratification of this convention, in the past 
thirty years alone Palestinian men in particular have faced cruel and inhumane treatment at the 
hands of Israel and its state actors. Throughout this time, Palestinians have attempted to establish 
a political, social, and economic identity for themselves while being constantly emasculated in 
front of their Arab neighbors. For example in the 1980s, boys as young as 14, such as Sulaiman 
Khatib, were separated from their parents, arrested, and sent to jail, some for over a decade. 
Families were constantly reminded of their sons’ imprisonment by having their rooms sealed off 
by Israeli soldiers and being habitually monitored or “checked on” in case the family thought of 
retaliating against the Israeli state  (Khatib & Chen, 2016). Torture was common in prison, as 
well as in detention spaces located at border crossings, checkpoints, or the airport. Yet it has not 
been as simple as physical torture alone. Many of those who were incarcerated have found it 
hard to find an adequate job after their imprisonment due to their criminal record. This detention 
and even post-incarceration of  Palestinian males, especially those ranging from 10-30 years of 
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age, impacts the community at large, changing the way masculinity and the roles of these young 
men develop within the community. 
 Arab masculinity, or ​rujulah​ , is typically acquired and re-affirmed by males through 
brave deeds, acts involving risk-taking as well as in expressions of fearlessness and 
assertiveness. It is through this process that young Arab boys acquire ​‘aql ​ (reasoning), which if 
fully bestowed upon them by the community around the age of forty. They then must be willing 
to protect and defend their honor (​sharaf​ ), face (​wajh​ ), kin, and community (Peteet, 1994). 
However, cultures under military occupation have little room to succeed in this capacity. Israeli 
state actors show Palestinian men that they cannot protect their children, and with this shame 
they even lose the respect of their children and their valued role in the community. 
Due to this loss of value the structure of the community changes. The positions that older 
men hold in Arab communities are passed down to their sons, in this case to young boys 
commonly detained and tortured in their stead. These young men become those in the 
community who mediate disputes, dominate conversation, and run the household in place of their 
fathers, who are still very much alive but now serve no real social or political purpose. Within 
the concept of Arab masculinity every detail is important, down to small things such as the 
seating arangment in a room demonstrates power and order. In Palestinian communities it is the 
older men who sit on the periphery indicating their difference to the young men who have taken 
leadership roles. These young leaders sit more in the center of the room to symbolize their 




This role reversal is possible through the fact that the Israeli soldiers skim over the men 
35 and older. They detain and beat the younger men and boys as a way to humiliate them, control 
them, and to hopefully put a stopper in their resistance when in fact they are doing the complete 
opposite. While these beatings and detentions are supposed to break and humiliate the body and 
damage the mind, Palestinians view this as a right of passage and view the body that endures this 
torture as a symbol of making sacrifices for the struggle or cause (​qadiyyah)​ .  Scholar Julie 
Peteet states in her work ​Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian "Intifada": A 
Cultural Politics of Violence, ​ “To Palestinians, the battered body, with its bruises and broken 
limbs, is the symbolic embodiment of a 20th century history of subordination and powerlessness- 
of ‘what we have to endure’- but also of their determination to resist and to struggle for national 
independence” (Peteet, 1994:38). These beatings, which were predominantly inflicted in private 
from 1948 through 1987 at the beginning of the  ​First Intifada​ , were designed as a tactic to 
weaken Palestinians, bring them shame, and enforce Israeli rule. However instead they came to 
mean honor and became the new symbol of manhood for young Palestinian men. This has not 
meant that Palestinians take violence upon their young men lightly. On the contrary, Palestinians 
embrace such punishment in order to make sense of this violence culturally which gives their 
young men purpose contrary to what the Israeli military is intends.  
 
1.2 History 
In order to understand Palestinian men's struggle to define their political identity and the 
lack of its international recognition one must take a journey through history. Though the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been brewing since the 1880s, the peak historical importance 
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began in the midst of World War I with the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of 1916. This 
was a series of correspondences between Sherif Hussein ibn Ali of the Hashemites, a generally 
popular Arab leader at the time and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner of 
Egypt, in which the United Kingdom promised an independent Arab state if the Arab people 
assisted them in the fight against the Ottoman Empire. The promised kingdom included “the 
limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca” (Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, 
1915). One basic problem was the letters ambiguity. This territory, some argue, did not include 
Palestine. With the Arabs’ agreement with the United Kingdom, the Arab revolt of 1916 against 
the Ottomans began. Arab nationalism competed with Ottomanism and Islam in order to 
establish an Arab kingdom free from the clutches of the imperial Ottomans. Finally by 1918, 
Arab Revolt forces seized Lebanon, Transjordan, Palestine as well as large parts of Syria and the 
Arabian peninsula, leaving the remainder of the Arab provinces under the Ottoman Empire who 
surrendered in 1919.  
Yet the promise made to Sherif Hussein was never fulfilled. In 1917, the British and 
French released the Sykes-Picot agreement an agreement drafted around the same time as the 
Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. This agreement, instead of giving the promised land to 
Sherif Hussein and the Arabs, divided the Middle East into economically prosperous colonies for 
the British and French, with only a small portion of the land given to Sherif Hussein and the 
Hashemites. This was the beginning of colonialism and its influence in the Middle East with the 
Arab peninsula and the Greater Levant being divided and distributed by these great European 
powers. This document was never brought into question during the Arab Revolt due to the 
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Hogarth Message, sent by Sir Mark Sykes, assuring Sherif Hussein and his fighters that their 
promise will be honored (Tessler, 1994). However, the Picot-Sykes agreement was later backed 
up by the British Mandate for Palestine (Palestinian Mandate for short) passed through the 
League of Nations. The Arabs were further outraged and confused with the release of the Balfour 
Declaration in 1917. The Balfour Declaration has been viewed largely as the first nail in the 
proverbial coffin for the Arab people in Palestine. Written by the United Kingdom’s Foreign 
Secretary, Arthur Balfour, to the second Baron Rothschild, Lionel Walter, the leader of the 
British Jewish community, this 100 word document states that there is a need to establish a 
“home” for the Jewish people in the land known as Palestine. 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine          
of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours              
to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that            
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of             
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political          
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country (Balfour Declaration, 1917). 
 
The Balfour Declaration was later worked into the 1922 version og the British Mandate of 
Palestine as an ​ultra vires​  act beyond their legal authority i.e., an addition to the League of 
Nations Covenant passed in 1919, which already acknowledged the Palestinian people as an 
independent nation-state and only deemed the mandate necessary to assist the Palestinians. The 
agreement was enacted by the League of Nations “stipulating that the British Mandate was a 
temporary ‘custodian’ that [would] lead the people who were ‘not yet able to stand by 
themselves’ to independence” (Farah, 2013:41; Mallison,1982:23; Tannous,1988:67 ). This 1
heavy colonial influence, coupled with the Palestinian elite’s inability to break out of the 
1 ​As cited by Randa Farah in “Palestinian Refugees, the Nation, and the Shifting Political Landscape”. 
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traditional cultural hierarchies doomed the Palestinian people immediately after the collapse of 
the Ottoman government.  
Before World War II,  Jewish Zionists had plans to build a country for the Jewish people 
who had long suffered in Europe. Theodor Herzl, often cited as the father of political Zionism, 
had long said that the Jewish state would be part of Europe and it would be a mission civilisatrice 
to the “crude and barbaric” Asia (Farah, 2013). Words such as “colony” were used commonly in 
early Zionist literature and discussions. Like colonial powers elsewhere, Zionists were searching 
for an end to their economical dissatisfaction. Generally colonialism advances economic gain 
under the guise that the power is “civilizing” a barbaric region (Ceisare, 2000). Political theorist 
Hannah Arendt similarly explains this economic dissatisfaction when speaking about the concept 
of imperialism, which many say is a precursor to colonialism. In her own words: 
Imperialism was born when the ruling class in capitalist production came up            
against national limitations to its economic expansion. The bourgeoisie turned          
into politics out of economic necessity; for if it did not to give up the capitalist                
system whose inherent law is constant economic growth, it had to impose this             
law upon its home governments and to proclaim expansion to be an ultimate             
political goal of foreign policy (Arendt, 1968: 126). 
 
What Arendt means by this is that when western states include states or territories, such as those 
in the Middle East, in their foreign policies, it is because they consider it an economic necessity. 
Palestine was put under British rule without the involvement of the Palestinian elite, in fact, they 




In 1947 the British Mandate of Palestine expired and the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA), passed ​Resolution 181​ , more commonly known as the ​Partition Plan​ . The 
Partition Plan​  stated that the land known as Palestine would be divided into two independent 
nation-states, with the city of Jerusalem granted autonomy, to be governed by an international 
body. Jewish people were to receive roughly 56% of the land and Palestinian Arabs the 
remaining 44%. Approved by the Jewish leadership in Palestine but rejected by the Palestinian 
Arabs (Tessler, 1994), who proposed a counter agreement, in which Palestine would be a 
democratic secular state while allowing the Jewish immigrants who came before the Balfour 
Declaration and their descendants to stay, which the Jews rejected (Encyclopedia Britannica, 
2014). Thus, no agreement was reached.  
On May 15, 1948, Israel was officially recognized as an independent nation state. Hours 
later war broke out and proactive ethnic cleansing of Palestinians began. At the time of ​Al 
Nakba​ , there were approximately 1.4 million Palestinians residing in Palestine’s villages and 
cities, where families had lived for generations. Due to the fear of violence and forced removal 
by the budding Israeli military, 700,000 Palestinians fled in droves to neighboring states like 
Jordan (still Transjordan), Lebanon, Syria, and more (Farah, 2013). Those 150,000 who avoided 
expulsion within Israel’s soon to be new borders obtained citizenship. Since that time they have 
over 50 laws that discriminate against them, leaving them in a basic state of second class 
citizenship, much like African Americans living under Jim Crow laws in the United States. The 
remaining 750,000 Palestinians became internally displaced persons (IDPs). Many now lived 
only a few miles from their original homes that now were inhabited by Israeli settlers (Farah, 
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2013:42). By the end of​ Al Nakba,​  approximately 78% of what was known to the Arabs as 
Palestine was under Israeli control, 22% more than what the Jews there would have had under 
UN Resolution 181 ​ (Farah, 2013). 
 Imperialistic wording in Zionist discourse was re-implemented immediately. However, 
unlike most colonial literature it removed the “natives” and the need to “civilize” them 
altogether, both physically and historically. One example of explicitly admitting to historical 
cleansing comes from a speech given by Moshe Dayan, an Israeli military leader and politician, 
which was expressed to Jewish Israeli students: 
We came to this country which was already populated with Arabs, and we are              
establishing a Hebrew, that is a Jewish State here...Jewish villages were built in             
place of Arab villages. You do not even know the names of these Arab villages,               
and I do not blame you, because these geography books no longer exist...There is              
not one place built in this country that did not have a former Arab population               
(Farah,2013:42; Said:1980:14) . 2
 
Having just survived the Jewish genocide of World War II, many of the same people now began 
to implement harsh laws and military action against the existing Palestinian Arab population. 
Some of these actions mimicked the treatment Jews had faced during World War II.  Some Jews 
now became the same abusers they feared in the Nazis. A colonial mirroring had begun in which 
Jewish  Israelis became the oppressors, mirroring the horrors and savagery that they previously 
faced (Peteet, 1994).  
By the end of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 Israel had obtained control over the final 22% 
of Palestine, with hundreds of thousands more Palestinians pushed into the overly populated 




West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as surrounding Arab states. Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip were living under military occupation, while other Arab states such as Jordan and 
Lebanon, were able to become their own fully recognized nation-states; the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan under King Abdullah and Lebanon with their new president Bechara Al-Khoury. Up 
until 1983 young Palestinian men in the West Bank and Gaza strip were arrested and detained for 
things ranging from having illegal molotov cocktails to something as simple and innocent as 
being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Soon thereafter, the first large-scale demonstrations 
of civil disobedience in Israel-Palestine was launched: the ​Intifada​ .  
The ​Intifada​ , or popular uprising, began in the Jabalia refugee camp, where an Israeli 
Defense Forces (or Occupation Forces depending on one’s word choice) truck crashed into a 
Palestinian civilian vehicle, killing four Palestinian refugees. Rather than the expected short-term 
violence, a large civil movement was launched which utilized a two prong strategy that, 
according to some, was trickled down from leaders such as the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization’s (PLO) chairman, Yasir Arafat, to the general population on the ground. This 
strategy involved resistance and civil disobedience tactics such as strikes and boycotts of Israeli 
institutions within the Occupied Territories (i.e the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). They also 
utilized economic methods of protests, such as not showing up to work in Israeli settlements or 
refusing to pay taxes (Tessler, 2009). Throwing stones and molotov cocktails was also common 
and later became the standard images the international media used to depict how the Palestinian 
people fought against tanks with stones. These protests were led predominantly by subgroups of 
the PLO, or their affiliates such as ​Al-Fatah​  or the Palestinian Communist Party. Figures such as 
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Arafat, and community leaders Hanan Ashrawi, Haidar Abdel-Shafi, and Faisal Husseini, were 
dedicated to a collective commitment to not engage in any form of lethal violence against Israeli 
state actors, including settlers.  
Most Jewish Israelis saw these mass protests and the refusals to show up to work or pay 
taxes as nothing more than unruly riots. Subsequently, the Israeli military came down hard on the 
Palestinians. Non-violent protests were met with rubber bullets, water cannons, tear gas, and live 
ammunition, with the Israeli military firing into the crowds of protesters whom consisted mostly 
of women and children, resulting in mass casualties. The Israeli military killed hundreds of 
Palestinians, a high proportion of them youth and civilians due to Minister of Defense Yitzhak 
Rabin’s “Might and Power” Policy, where Israeli soldiers began using mass incarcerations and 
collective punishments as deterrents (Peteet, 1994). The ​Intifada​  finally came to an end with the 
signing of the Oslo Accords in September, 1993 (Dayyat, 2016:5-8).  
The Oslo Accords slowly became understood as a betrayal by the majority of 
Palestinians, and ultimately led to unrest between different political factions of within the 
Palestinian community (Farah, 2013). By 2000, the ​Second Intifada​  was launched, which led to 
more public beatings, detentions, and illegal acts, Palestinians had created a voice for 
themselves. And yet, their political identity was still commonly viewed internationally as 
extremely controversial. 
  
1.3 Palestinian Identity Today- Backlashes of Colonial Influence 
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Political identity is defined as political arguments reflecting perspectives and interests of 
one or more groups with whom people identify. This includes ways in which people’s political 
nature or participation is defined through loosely correlated social organizations (Hamoudi, 
2010). Today, Palestinian political identity has been somewhat established ​de jure​ , however it is 
the way that it was established wherein the problem lies. For example, I am one of several 
million people who calls herself an American citizen, and though as an Arab-American it has 
been difficult to establish my own political identity growing up in the post 9/11 era, I was able to 
do it without fear of being attacked physically by the state. I did not have to worry about being 
barred and violated from creating an identity for myself. I am able to engage in civil 
disobedience and was not met with forces that were there to quiet me at all costs. This does not 
hold true for Palestinian men living in the Occupied Territories, refugee camps, or those who live 
in Israel, as ​de facto​  second class citizens. I did not have to establish my identity in a 
post-colonial political environment, whereas Palestinians have never had free reign over the land 
in which they reside. 
 The former territory of the Ottoman Empire went almost immediately to the British then 
to Israelis, all of whom used imperialist tactics during their rule of Palestine and Palestinians 
(Tessler, 2009). According to postcolonial theorists Aimee Cesaire and Frantz Fanon, 
colonialism in itself is an indication that there is greed, and colonization demonstrates that the 
colonizer is sick and uncivilized (Ceisare, 2000). Colonized people almost always retaliate with 
violence and “...[their] freedom in and through violence”(Fanon, 1961). Violence in terms of 
decolonization is almost always a reality, particularly when the colonizing power does not want 
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to give in to demands that the “colonized people” have regarding their freedom. The Palestinian 
people along, with other Arabs under the banner of the Great Arab Revolt, fought for a total 
removal of the Ottoman leaders from what they thought was going to be their own land. Their 
attempts to remove the imperial power was violent, bloody and messy. In many of his works 
such as ​Wretched of the Earth, ​ Fanon states that the act of decolonization must indeed be a 
bloody affair due to the establishing an identity for men living under colonial rule. It is messy 
and violent because those who are ruled over have no choice, they see no other option. This is 
what the Palestinians have been doing for decades, through daily protests, violent clashes, and 
revolts carried out against the state of Israel.  
As stated previously, early Zionist rhetoric was littered with imperial language in which 
they expressed the need to civilize the region socio-politically. While Palestinians were trying to 
break away from European neo-colonial rule in the aftermath of the World War I, early Zionist 
thinkers were already coming up with ways to dominate the land that became known as Israel. 
Palestinians, unlike their fellow Arab neighbors, were unable to come together and break down 
boundaries of clan separation and hierarchy to secure an independent state. Ultimately  they were 
failed by the League of Nations, who did nothing to put a halt to the greed of the European 
superpowers that divided the region between themselves for economic prosperity. This had a 
significant  negative impact on the Palestinians, who went from living in a British colony, to 
living in an Israeli one.  
The Palestinian elite that ultimately failed to come together before 1948 are largely to 
blame for the current lack of stable identity for Palestinian men today (Khalidi, 1997). According 
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to Fanon, who himself identifies as an intellectual, the elites are not the ones who get anything 
done when it comes to liberating a group from colonial rule. It is in fact the common population 
that must be responsible for the liberation and establishment of a new identity, separate from 
their colonizers (Fanon,1961). We have seen this occur in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The 
disconnect between the older leadership of those such as Yasser Arafat (before his death in 2004) 
signified a transition of power to the young people. Manhood was forever redefined and it was 
young men and their bodies that were used to fight this revolution against the neo-colonizers of 
Israel, not the leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA) or PLO.  
Now these young men are the ones responsible for establishing their political identity to 
counteract the Israeli identity. They are becoming the leaders of their communities and are dealt 
the majority of the fighting and violence due to the fact that Israeli soldiers target them for their 
highly politicized nature and in order to keep families obedient and quiet. In fact their arrests and 
subsequent beatings and detentions are documented by multitudes of groups that document 
human rights infractions within the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. One such group is the Palestinian 
Centre for Human Rights, who put out weekly, monthly and yearly reports outlining the number 
of human rights infractions committed by the Israeli military every year. For example, in the 
week of July 14-20, 2016 alone, 59 civilians were arrested with the majority being young men 
under the age of 30, and most being students at local universities (PCHR, 2016). Statistics like 
these demonstrate that these young men are the ones bearing most of the violence as seen in the 
high levels of torture and arrests among this specific demographic of Palestinians, and as a result 
the community has no choice but to view them differently. In this thesis while I focus 
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predominantly on the political identity of young Palestinian men, and how it has been created in 
highly violent ways via torture and arrest, I also focus on how the method of establishing a 
political identity during a conflict is what has created spikes of ethnic tension and violence 
between Israelis and Palestinians.  
 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict has been the focal point of international headlines and 
agendas since the end of the World War II almost seventy years ago, making this conflict one of 
the longest ongoing conflicts in today’s world, as well as the largest protracted refugee situation 
in the world (Gifford, 2016). That being said there are copious amounts of literature and research 
on this subject as well as thousands of reports (both official and via the media) reporting on the 
day-to-day violence that Palestinians face in the refugee camps, the Occupied Territories, and in 
Israel itself, where more than one million Palestinians have obtained citizenship.  
Some of these works include ​A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ​ by Mark 
Tessler and ​One Land Two States ​ by Mark LeVine and Mathias Mossberg. Wherein take 
historical narratives and showing how it is relevant to the political identity of Palestinian men 
and the construction of that identity. I also focus more on the current social impact that this 
historical narrative of the conflict has had on the population of Palestinian men today. I will be 
using reports from organizations such as the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) and 
Human Rights Watch (HRW) as well as officially documented narratives of arrests and abuses 
that have been already published in academic sources such as ​Occupied Voices: Stories of 
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Everyday Life From The Second Intifada, ​ by Wendy Pearlman. Of course, I additionally 
integrate classic books on the conflict, such as ​Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern 
National Consciousness ​ by Rashid Khalidi and works by Dr. Julie Peteet, one of the leading 
Middle Eastern studies experts with a particular emphasis on Palestine such as her article ​"Male 
Gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian "Intifada"​ .  
I will also analyze international law and humanitarian law along with significant amounts 
of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions on the issue itself. Torture and 
military force being used on civilian populations is illegal by international standards and many 
state actors have been brought up in front of the United Nation Tribunals to be legally held 
accountable for their human rights infractions. Some states such as Iraq and others were 
eventually taken to war over the issue (i.e. the Iraqi Gulf War of 1990). Yet the state of Israel has 
not been held legally or morally responsible for any of their actions in this conflict.  Western 
media portrays Palestinians as the ones who do not want peace and that they brought their 
misfortune upon themselves (Pearlman, 2003). I also utilize well known international documents 
such as the ​Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment ​ (CAT) as well as all four ​Geneva Conventions ​ and the ​Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights ​ (​UDHR​ ). These documents along with the analysis of their impact as found in 
Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette’s work ​International Human Rights: Law and Practice, ​ is 
extremely important to understand the lack of political rights and therefore lack of identity that 
the Palestinian men have. They are not granted the same rights and liberties that an Israeli or 
myself would have. Instead Palestinian men must establish who they are and their political and 
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social impacts on society in a world void of the rule of law and liberties that would normally be 
granted to a human via these international conventions. This is extremely important to consider 
when fully analyzing the lack of a de facto political identity of these men.  
Finally, and arguably, the most importantly I look at several different colonial and 
postcolonial texts that analyze nationalism and political identity. Theorists such as Fanon, 
Arendt, Said and their works, among others are extremely important in understanding both how 
political identity is formed in a postcolonial society and how the violence unfolds frequently due 
to the violent nature of colonization both within its rhetoric and practice. Also these theorists and 
their works will help better explain the importance of the violence on the body and how it is the 
Palestinian men who are the ones using their bodies for this revolution. They are the ones 
enduring the injustices of their oppressors while trying to fight back, creating this ​de jure​  identity 
throughout generations. This very idea that the colonizers are inflicting injustice on the actual 
bodies of those they colonize is not a new concept. The Israeli military inflicting violence against 
the Palestinians is explained in Hannah Arendt’s ​The Origins of Totalitarianism ​ by way of the 
“Banality of Evil” concept. She explains this by addressing the crimes perpetrated by Nazi 
soldiers and high ranking officers who were just following orders. It is in fact the Israeli soldiers 
who are responsible for perpetuating the evil and making it a social norm (Arendt, 1968). More 
of this will be discussed in the following Literature Review Chapter. 
 
1.5 Methodological Approach 
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Since there is plenty of literature on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as well as the 
aforementioned theories, I utilize a literary analysis in approaching this thesis. Also due to the 
long standing history and the different narratives of this conflict it is important to dissect it from 
the lens of nationalism, identity, and colonial aftermath. There is also copious amounts of media 
being produced daily on the issue and I sift through these various depictions of the conflict in 
order to generate an academic analysis of the issue at hand. I try to create a link between the 
spike of ethnic tension and the torture done to the bodies of Palestinian men who are trying to 
establish their political identities in a lawless colonial-like occupation. Simultaneously I analyze 
generational shifts of what that identity means to Palestinian men. I paid particular attention to 
works that referenced Palestinian identity theorists such as Khalidi due to his authentic 
understanding of the Palestinian narrative rather than the largely accepted Western interpretation 
of the issue. While I did not intend to discredit Western interpretations of the Israeli/ Palestinian 
conflict, I paid particular attention to Palestinian narratives since these narratives are largely 
ignored in Western media and are just starting to be explored in today’s academic realm. 
I recognize the fact that this is indeed an overdone topic in which I hope to bring 
something new to the table. Therefore I want to put more thought into analyzing colonial and 
postcolonial theory. I explored the impact that both neo-colonial policies and the failure of the 
Palestinian elite has had on the young men of Palestine. These two factors have placed the 
burden on these men and ultimately failed them by not giving them the means to express their 
identity politically, economically, and socially. I also take the physical representation of 
Palestinian males’ political identity, the beaten body of a young man, and analyzing its meaning 
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as well as the meaning of these generational shifts. This is why I focused on theorists such as 
Arendt, Fanon, and Ceisare due to the fact that they are not conventional Western theorists, but 
rather they expose the greed of Western societies and their cruel and archaic need to “civilize” 
others. These theories coupled with the history of the conflict will bring light to factors that may 
have been overlooked by the majority of scholars in this particular field of study.  
Last but certainly not least, I also examining personal narratives, those previously 
documented and via interviews conducted myself. Personal narratives are key to understanding 
what Palestinian men believe that their identity is. They are the ones that ultimately ask the 
question “who are we?” Yes, the international community has a say in how Palestinian men 
answer this question, but how they answer it is what I am interested in for this paper. Their 
identity is so turbulent and so ingrained in violence that hearing their interpretation is key to truly 
understanding how things such as history and theory have truly influenced the progression of 
ethnic tension and prolonged this conflict. Identity and its importance should not be overlooked 
when talking about colonial occupation. It is for that very reason that men rebel and take arms 









Chapter 2- Literature Review 
 
2.1 Literature Review Introduction 
Identity is a complex concept that is difficult to dissect. Yet it is something that is 
imperative to understand in regards to Israel and Palestine. Many theories have been proposed as 
to how one's identity is established and its importance to the development of a political 
environment within a state. Other theories discuss the relationship between identity  and the 
colonial history and ties that have influenced the development of the state and violence within a 
state. Finally numerous theories have been explored about identity and its formation in terms of 
colonial and postcolonial violence. While these theories explore the concept of identity  in the 
context of numerous examples, this thesis focuses solely on the formation of Palestinian 
political, social, and national identities as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has progressed from 
1948 through today.  
The dominant trend reflected in this literature review is that the formation of political 
identity is directly related to peaks in ethnic tensions in ongoing conflicts, namely the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This literature review will also discuss the formation of political 
identity in the midst of instances of violence and torture causing the violence to be prolonged and 
peace talks to be constantly disrupted. Theorists including Cesaire and Fanon have stated that the 
violence is an inherent side effect of decolonization and revolution. Whereas Peteet and Farah 
have established certain patterns connecting the unique definition of Arab masculinity to the 
politicized nature of young Palestinian men. The general consensus among scholars is that state 
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sanctioned violence and torture on a specific body of individuals changes how their identity is 
formed, utilized, and viewed on the global political stage.  
This literature review predominantly deals with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict generally 
and levels of violence and torture in this conflict specifically. Because much of the history of this 
conflict is tied to colonialism, neocolonialism, and subsequent responses, I also be analyze 
colonial and postcolonial theory. This is immediately followed by an analysis of theories 
regarding identity and nationalism, and how they function in a consistently violent environment. 
Finally, I review discourses on state violence, and how it impacts the formation of identity in the 
Middle East, such as one’s masculinity.  
 
2.2 Colonial Theory and Decolonization Violence 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, colonialism is “the policy or practice of acquiring 
partial or full control over another country, occupying it with settlers, and exploiting it 
economically” (Oxford Dictionary, 2016). After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1916, Arab 
countries scrambled to become independent and create their own identities. While some were 
more successful, like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Palestine was not. In 1922, the British Mandate 
for Palestine was ratified by the League of Nations, giving Great Britain full control over 
Palestine (Tessler, 2009). This was an ​ultra vires ​ act; it was beyond the legal power of the 
League of Nations to make Great Britain temporary custodians of Palestine. Nonetheless, they 
maintained that they had to lead people who were not yet able to lead themselves (Mallison, 
1982; Tannous, 1988; Farah, 2013).  
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This was the guise that European powers also used to justify colonialism in places such 
as Africa, the Americas, and elsewhere in the Middle East. They were trying to “civilize” 
indigenous populations because, so they argued, they are unable to govern themselves. This not 
only demonstrates the insatiable greed of “the white man,” according to those like Fanon and 
other colonial theorists, but also demonstrates a need to show that they are better than other 
white, colonial empires.  
This is echoed in the words of former United Kingdom Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill, in a statement he made about India during British colonial rule: “​We have not entered 
this war for profit or expansion. Let me, however, make this clear: we mean to hold our own. I 
have not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British 
Empire” (The Guardian, 1942).​ ​While Churchill may have stated that they are not in this for 
greed, that is exactly what a colony does. The fact that he did not wish to liquidate any British 
assets demonstrated this. Colonialism, is a strategy many Western states of large economic 
influence use in order to quench their greed and obtain more power under the guise of spreading 
their civilized way of life to those who they think need it. 
According to Fanon, this type of colonialism works by shattering the psychological 
mechanism of an indigenous people. European colonial powers believed that their colonization 
of lands and imposing their economic, political and religious wills on the indigenous people was 
a way of saving them and in a way justifies what they do to the indigenous population. They are 
approached as if they are parasitic, brutish savages that must be colonized and made into decent 
beings because their pre-colonial way of life was immoral (Fanon, 1967). Native peoples are 
colonized due to the fact that they have a natural need to be dependent; they unconsciously desire 
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domination (Fanon, 1967; Mannoni, 1956). Others, like Vladimir Lenin, contend that issues such 
as imperialism and colonialism are implemented by the bourgeoisie in order to further propel 
their control over those lower socio-economically, thereby allowing the elites to hoard wealth for 
themselves (Lenin, 1969). Essentially, Lenin says, it all comes down to capital as the root of 
imperialism and colonialism. The bourgeoisie take whatever road leads to the most capital in the 
quickest and easiest way. If there happens to be a group of people in the way, then they mold 
these people  to suit the needs of the colonizer.  
Europeans knew how to capitalize on the natural resources and land that belonged to the 
natives. In this light, Cesaire and Fanon claim that colonialism is as an act of war that native 
populations were unable to fight due to the power structures put in place by colonizers. From a 
colonizer's perspective native people should be grateful for their interference because it comes 
with protection and benefits. All they have to do is “act white” and “fit in” with European norms. 
But this actually causes these populations to be white-washed and their culture and traditions to 
disappear (Fanon, 1967). Fanon maintains that European civilizations are responsible for the 
racially and economically driven colonialism that benefitted no one but Europeans, always at the 
indigenous community’s expense.  
The impact of colonialism is seen quite clearly in Palestine. Without the concept of 
colonialism, one could argue that there would not have even been a conflict. When the Ottoman 
Empire fell after World War I, those who participated in the Great Arab Revolt of 1916 were 
eager to begin living under a unified Arab kingdom. However due to the Sykes-Picot agreement, 
made public in 1917, that dream was destroyed before it had a chance to manifest physically. As 
stated previously the Sykes-Picot agreement was drafted by the British and French to divide the 
 
33 Dayyat 
Middle East into colonial provinces that would be ruled by these two western powers. It stated 
that the lands were to be divided into spheres of British and French control, in order for the two 
powers to obtain the spoils from the once great empire. A colonial power was coming to rule 
over the Palestinian people and would not grant them the sovereignty that the people fought for 
during the World War I. In the mandate it was stated that the Palestinians would be able to create 
representative bodies that advocated for their needs politically but that was not implemented 
either. It was a total and utter eclipse of the Palestinian people’s political and social rights and 
the beginning of turning them into the “other” rather than a collective people (Rotberg, 2006). 
Works such as ​Orientalism ​ by Edward Said analyze the ramification of the West 
“othering” the Middle East and Asia, or the Orient, as it was once known. Palestine is “one of the 
most obvious and tragic examples of othering in contemporary times” (Ashcroft, 2010:291). As a 
Palestinian male, Said was able to show that this idea of Orientalizing shaped his own identity as 
well as the identities of other Palestinian men. In his work Said demonstrates the power of 
worldliness, or the power of the representer, on the identity of not just Palestinians, but people 
within the Middle East at large. According to Bill Ashcroft (while referencing Said), “The real 
issue is whether there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all 
representations, because they ​are ​ representations[...]”(Said, 1978:272, Ashcroft, 2010-291-92) . 3
That said, while the international community may have already assigned an identity to a group of 
people or a state, one is still able to self-represent of self-identify.Ultimately it is up to a group to 
determine what its own identity is, though this is always at risk of being denied.  




The Palestinian people are arguably the prime example of a group denied the right to self 
identify due to colonialism. In his article ​Representation and Liberation: From Orientalism to 
the Palestinian Crisis, ​ Ashcroft makes this argument, ​ also asking the question who or what 
denied them this right to self identify. Ashcroft even goes so far as to ask how much of that 
denial of self identification can be blamed on Palestinian men. As mentioned previously, the 
Palestinian upper class were not able to overcome their social and political differences. This 
from a colonial powers perspective demonstrated that they were unable to represent themselves 
like other states in the Middle East. This paired with the colonial rule of Western European 
nations like Great Britain and France created an identity vacuum in which the Palestinian people 
virtually had to scramble to come up with identity to fill in the hole left by the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire. The perpetuation of neo-colonialism and military occupation by Israel, its state 
actors, and its allies is solely based denying the Palestinians their existence (Ashcroft, 2010). 
Ashcroft goes on to cite Said, by saying  it is not only a matter of prejudice or Zionist 
propaganda, but is rooted in the discourse of  Orientalism that according to Said “ [has] 
entrenched ​cultural​  attitudes toward Palestinians deriving from age-old Western prejudices about 
Islam, the Arabs and the Orient” (Said, 1980; xiv) 
 
2.3 State Sanctioned Violence and Human Rights 
State-sanctioned violence is an academic phrase that soften means something much 
uglier: torture. Whichever word is used it is a terrible mark on human history that it is used as a 
tool of contemporary warfare. Under the United Nations many different conventions and 
declarations have been ratified and passed into law about torture and what constitutes as such, 
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particularly following the horrors that were uncovered after the end of the World War II. In fact, 
human rights became a large concern for the international community after the war and with that 
concern International Human Rights Law (IHR) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
became key in how states were to be governed and how they would interact with each other.  
The founding document that paved way for copious amounts of conventions to be drafted 
and ratified was the ​Universal Declaration of Human Rights ​ (UDHR). The UDHR was 
culimiated in 1948, and adopted by the United Nations that December, just seven months after ​Al 
Nakba ​ (Bantekas & Oette, 2013) ​. ​ It was a document largely based off Western principles of 
what they believed every person in the world has a right to simply by existing. This was well and 
good for those in the world who had a state to call their own, as those states were in theory 
supposed to protect those rights. Palestinians resided in or near the very state that sought to 
destroy their history from the memory of the land; land that they were given by the United 
Nations as well as land that was not legally granted to them that they seized in ​Al Nakba 
(Tessler, 2009). In fact the very first article mentions that all should act towards each other in a 
spirit of brotherhood. (UDHR, 1948). 
 This statement of brotherhood clearly did not ring true in this conflict. Instead, it is the 
polar opposite according to the PCHR, Israeli soldiers arrest and detain scores of Palestinian men 
predominantly between the ages of 10-30, and beatings and torture are extremely commonplace 
in the detention centers (Khatib & Chen, 2016​). ​Under article five, section one, of the UDHR 
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” 
(UDHR, 1948). Contrary to this document, torture in the prisons are habitual and used as a tactic 
to destroy the body and mind of the young men that they detain so they are no longer capable of 
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engaging in political protests and movements against the Zionist regime of Israel. Israeli soldiers 
and state actors are perpetuating the pain of their fathers and ancestors onto the Palestinian men 
and boys that they detain because they want to cut away the movements against them straight 
from the source, and to them that is the body and mind of young Palestinian men.  
The UDHR is extremely broad and does not outline any strict guidelines that countries 
must adhere to.  It is not even declared law but instead was presented more like general 
statements that everyone should follow. The main downside is that the declaration does not lay 
out consequences to those who break the guidelines. Later on, several other conventions came 
into being that created a more firm foundation for IHR and IHL going forward. Conventions like 
the four ​Geneva Conventions​ , the ​Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide ​ (CPPCG) as well as the ​Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ​ (The 1951 
Convention). One convention in particular is extremely important especially when paired with 
any of the four ​Geneva Conventions​ . ​The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment​  or CAT was adopted and signed on December 10th, 
1984 and later made into law in June of 1987. CAT bluntly defines and outlines what constitutes 
torture and what states are supposed to do when coming face to face with it.  It also outlines what 
obligations the states have to protect their citizens against torture. CAT being entered into force 
signaled that those who break this treaty will be punished by the international community for 
crimes against humanity which up until 1948 did not seem like something the world had the 
power to do.  
Torture is defined under CAT as: 
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or           
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as           
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,           
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punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is              
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or          
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any            
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the            
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public           
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not            
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or          
incidental to lawful sanctions (CAT, 1984). 
 
This mandate means that state actors whom bestow any cruel or unusual punishment onto either                
their citizens or any foreigners will be tried and held accountable for their actions by the United                 
Nations. Non-state actors are not included under this convention, however due to the fact that               
this was signed into law states have an obligation to make torture and other forms of inhuman                 
treatment illegal in their own state constitutions. 
The year that this convention passed was just three years after the beginning of the ​First                 
Intifada​ , in Israel-Palestine where regular mass incarcerations and beatings of young protestors            
began. In full view of media cameras, Palestinian men and youth were seen being beaten and                
shot at in the streets and the infamous image of Palestinians facing tanks with rocks was shown                 
to the international community for the first time. Yitzhak Rabin, the Minister of Defense at the                
time, enacted a Might is Right Policy in which he called for “might, power and beatings” against                 
Palestinians’ bodies. Bone-breaking and violence were open and public rather than the private             
beatings and torture used predominantly before this policy (Peteet, 1994). Prior to the ​Intifada​ ,              
the Israeli military​ detention centers commonly used torture as a method to quell any sort of                
political uprising that was beginning in the Palestinian communities and it is still used to this                
day. Most Israeli state actors (i.e the military) know nothing but violent and discouraging              
rhetoric about the Palestinian people and their young men. Due to this they do not expect                
anything but violent interactions with them, mostly because their superiors and government            
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perpetuate this narrative through the orders they issue to subordinates. Some call this concept is               
the “Banality of Evil”.  
Coined by Hannah Arendt, the “Banality of Evil” is when one is unaware that they are                
committing acts of evil, as they are merely engaging in a behavior normal to the society in which                  
they live. They are essentially perpetuating a classical narrative of following the orders of their               
superiors. They are obeying the orders of their superiors that follow that narrative, which is               
something that Arendt actually criminalizes more than actually issuing out the orders. She             
contends that on the whole, the masses are responsible for perpetuating violence and evil              
(Arendt, 1951). Rabin’s policies and orders during the ​First Intifada​ , gave way to a more violent                
way for the Israeli military and other state actors to deal with Palestinian men. And since the                 
1980s, reports of torture and state sanctioned violence have only increased. 
Torture is not only a physical punishment, however. The mental side effects of being              
arrested and beaten at random is very real and a family’s worst nightmare is having their young                 
son, father, or cousin ripped away from them in the middle of the night and not be seen for                   
weeks, if ever (Tessler, 2009). According to CAT and other international conventions, the state              
of Israel and its actors should be tried by the international community at the International               
Criminal Court (ICC) and held accountable for its actions. While Israel has clearly violated these               
sanctions, it continues to get away with dozens of international human rights daily infractions,              
more specifically inflicted on the young Palestinian men. This has become almost a ritualized              
right of passage for Palestinian men whose beaten and broken bodies have become the prideful               
symbol of the movement in larger communities.  
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This torture and beating down of the Palestinian community through these young men             
has caused unimaginable repercussions both politically and economically. Young Palestinian          
men are unable to work after their detention and if they do it is predominantly in the unofficial                  
market. This causes an extreme example of economic disparity between the struggling            
Palestinian community and the prosperity of the Israeli economy and therefore, driving a lot of               
Palestinian men to become desperate and impulsive. By utilizing illegal force on these young              
men, the Israeli state has created this economic dependency and regression of a whole              
community (LeVine & Mossberg, 2014). In ​Palestine Speaks: Narratives of Life Under            
Occupation, by Cate Malek and Mateo Hoke, the authors demonstrate the difficulty of living a               
normal life in Palestine is demonstrated by the stories that were collected by Malek and Hoke.                
Palestinian men’s lives are constantly complicated unnecessarily by Israeli military checkpoints,           
patrols, and other security measures. They also explains the difficulty facing the Palestinians in              
terms of generating income and living economically viable lives. According to Malek and Hoke,              
“It’s difficult for most Palestinians to find jobs, and of those that are available, most are low                 
paying, menial or dangerous (Malek & Hoke, 2014: 13). They continue to illustrate the food,               
water, and electric restrictions as well as the endless checkpoints and restriction of movement              
that Palestinians face causing the life of Palestinians to be viewed as “one of forced indignity”                
(Malek & Hoke 2014: 13).  
Among other reasons, this is extremely difficult for young men because they are expected              
to provide for their families. Due to the the constant arrests and detentions, many are not able to                  
get any sort of sustainable job to help them sustain their families. They become desperate and                
often take on menial or dangerous work not part of the official economy or even illegal. This                 
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puts these young men further at risk, as they are faced with exploitation and further               
incarceration. It is also a huge risk for the families. If these young men are arrested or if they die                    
while completing work that may be dangerous, not only will those families lose their young son,                
brother, or cousin--but they can also lose their sole source of income, moving that family further                
and further below the poverty line than they already were.  
Mental health has been a large issue within Palestinian males and the greater Palestinian              
community. Torture on the individual body not only permanently scars a young man but creates               
a devastating ripple effect can make its way through the community at large. For example,               
Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported in their 2015 World Report that as of October of 2015                
over 120 Palestinians were killed and over 11,000 were injured by Israeli state actors versus the                
17 civilian and 3 soldier deaths on the Israeli side (HRW, 2016). Israel also detained over 300                 
Palestinians including young children without charge (HRW, 2016). These detentions usually           
lead to the beatings and other forms of torture. 
In short torture, both physical and mental, leave irreparable damage on the mind of these                
young men. Many develop Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and some never fully recover              
enough to be able to function properly in the community. Soldiers began using more extreme               
methods that were sexually abusive in nature attempting to scar the young men further. The               
sexual abuse is especially traumatic because Arab culture finds it shameful for a man to be                
forced into sexual acts against his will because it contradicts the fact that Arab men are strong,                 
masculine, and are able to take care of themselves. This is particularly significant in a culture                
that reinforces that a man’s masculinity can be taken away from them (Peteet, 2013).  
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Mental health issues and the like are extremely common place in Palestinian communities             
at large and stories that have been documented by multitudes of scholars. In ​Occupied Voices:               
Stories of Everyday Life From the Second Intifada,​ Wendy Pearlman, documents a cluster of              
stories of those who lived during this second uprising. In one story, for example, a fourteen year                 
old Palestinian named Issam experiences something horrific. A resident of Gaza in the city of               
Rafah, one day Issam was at his home, near the community market, when a group of Israeli                 
soldiers began conducting on the ground patrols. A group of young Palestinian men decided to               
throw stones to protect the village; soldiers responded by opening fire. Issam stepped out of his                
house when hearing the gunshot and was hit.  
“I was hit with bullets in my right leg, bullets in my left leg, one bullet in                 
my head, and two bullets in my back. I was knocked unconscious and             
didn’t wake up again until I was in the hospital in Khan Younis. Later I               
found out that I was lying in the street for over twenty minutes before the               
Israelis left and someone was able to come and rescue me” (Pearlman,            
2003: 114).  
 
After doctors amputated his leg, he was offered a chance to receive medical treatment in               
San Francisco. While he was grateful for the assistance and kindness he received from the               
American people, he stated his anger and almost disappointment with the American government             
for not being the ones who helped him. But rather Issam believes that they perpetuate the torture                 
and violence that he and others endure in Israel and the Occupied Territories by selling Israel the                 
very weapons that they use against them and not voicing outrage on behalf of Palestinians.. 
After returning to Gaza, Issam is ashamed of going the beach due to his new leg                
deformities. In order to see doctors for check ups, Issam has to file a lawsuit every time he                  
wishes to see the doctor in Jerusalem to acquire a security pass. He cannot participate in social                 
movements like other men his age are doing, for fear of being targeted by Israeli soldiers due to                  
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his inability to flee. To him the Israelis “robbed me of everything beautiful in this world”                
(Pearlman, 2003:117). He lives in a constant state of fear and anxiety due to his injuries, and is                  
not an isolated case. Most who reside in Gaza and the West Bank knows someone who was shot                  
or killed by the Israeli military. This is a very real fear that all Palestinian men face in the context                    
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
Torture is practiced worldwide and demonstrates a total absence of the rule of law.              
According to scholars like Jeremy Waldron, who in his article ​Torture and Positive Law              
examines this breakdown, states that allowing torture methods to go on within a legal system is                
not only disturbing and shameful--but also a threat to established legal systems and the sanctity               
of international law and cooperation (Waldron, 2005). ​The total disregard of the rule of law               
creates a hotbed of desperation that people would do anything to get out of. Some Palestinian                
men, often due to the sheer desperation and terror that they face everyday, turn to radicalized                
Islamic terror groups. These terrorist organizations offer services to these young men and their              
families in exchange for their commitment to the group, usually ending in further arrest or death.                
Torture and its repeated use on Palestinian men and boys continues a vicious cycle. State               
sanctioned violence leaves little room for the development of education, economic structures,            
and erases chances for peace talks. Much of this stagnation is due to heavy amounts of mistrust                 
the Palestinian men have against the Israeli officials. These officials deem their torture a legal               
form of insuring the national security of Israel at the expense of the Palestinian community and                
at the expense of the young men whose bodies and minds become broken as a result. 
 
2.4 Nationalism and Identity 
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Nationalism is an unusual concept that can pervade one's identity, and even do strange 
things to it. Nationalism is debated largely within the context of its positive or negative impact 
on international political climates as well as its influence on identity. In terms of the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, nationalism played two very different roles:  it is able to project the 
conflict on to the global stage, and at the same time, shrink it into nothing. In regards to the 
Palestinian struggle nationalism could have been the final nail in the coffin in the 1960s. In fact, 
one type of nationalism that made an appearance in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict gave the 
opposing argument more ammunition than helping the Palestinians develop their identity and 
that is Pan-Arabism. 
 Pan-Arabism is a  type of nationalism said to have been coined by Gamal Abdel Nasser, 
President of Egypt from 1956 to 1970, that was intended to unify the Arab people as one nation 
rather than separating them according to the Arab countries that emerged following World War 
II. It was also a way to create a unified front against the Jewish settlers and state actors unlike 
which had never been seen before. The Arab people were finally able to create a unified front 
against the Israeli state in order to defend the identity and existence of the Palestinian people 
after decades of struggling. This type of nationalism according to those like Khalidi, lost ground 
after ​ Yom An-Naksa ​ or ​Al Naksa​  after the terrible loss the Arab army experienced as the hands 
of the Israeli military, but was actually more popular in the West (Khalidi, 1997). 
  Nationalism, according to Merriam-Webster, as two different things and both definitions 
play into how nationalism influences this conflict. The first definition is “ a feeling that people 
have of being loyal to and proud of their country often with the belief that it is better and more 
important than other countries” (Merriam-Webster, 2016). Nationalism comes out frequently in 
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times of tragedy and victory. This became important internationally after the end of World War I 
and II with the collapse of the last empire and the creation of the modern nation-state. 
Nationalism became an outlet for self-determination for the citizens of different states, as a way 
to demonstrate pride for the area in which they reside. Nationalism would be later utilized by 
state actors during events including but not limited to elections, war, and other crises to rally 
citizens together for a common cause.  
With Palestinians, this definition of nationalism means something slightly different. After 
Al Nakba ​ in 1948, many if not all Palestinians began feeling a renewed sense of pride in a land 
that they saw as their own. Many Palestinians today see their occupied land as the heart of the 
Middle East, stating that any and all issues that come out of this region are centered on this one 
prolonged issue. ​ Palestinians worldwide take deep prideful in their origins. Many even hold on 4
to relics that represent them as a people; such as the keys to the houses they were forced to leave, 
pictures, and to the lucky few, birth certificates that show that they were indeed born in what was 
known as Palestine. 
Merriam-Webster’s second definition for nationalism is “ a desire by a large group of 
people (such as people who share the same culture, history, language, etc.) to form a separate and 
independent nation of their own” (Merriam-Webster, 2016). This definition embodies the core 
desire of the Palestinian people, whether those living abroad, in refugee camps, in Israel or the 
Occupied Territories. Palestinians want their own independent nation-state that they can self 
govern and live with people who share that same connection to the land and the history. 
According to scholars like Erika Harris, “Nationalism has a vision of the society whose interests 
4 This statement in reference to interviews I conducted that will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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it purports to represent but this vision, unlike other ideologies, is dominated by ‘who’ the 
participants are rather than by ‘how’ the society should be governed” (Harris, 2009:24). 
Nationalism has become a double edged sword for the Palestinian people.  It rallies them 
together in times of hardship, while they are in the street protesting for example. Young 
Palestinian men utilize nationalist rhetoric when leading the community, using their bodies to 
defend their ​de jure ​ nation againsts the ​de facto ​ state of Israel. According to Khalidi, the weapon 
of nationalism has been detrimental and gave more power to the Pro-Israeli allies. The author 
states that due to the fact that Palestinians were experiencing this nationalism as Arabs in 
general, there truly were no Palestinians from the beginning. Khalidi states that allies of Israel 
say that this fight for the land of “Palestine” was an anti-semitic campaign against the Jewish 
state led by neighboring Arab states. This is not entirely true. While many Palestinian men got 
caught up in the narratives of Nasser and were rallying around Pan-Arabism, to others 
Pan-Arabism added a more complex layer to their identity and gave more strength to political 
groups such as the PLO and Al Fatah.  
In an extremely debatable field, some argue that Nationalism is much more of a modern 
concept than many think. According to Ernest Renan’s ​What is a Nation?, ​ “since the end of the 
Roman Empire, or rather since the dismemberment of the empire of Charlemagne [in the 12th 
century], Western Europe appears to us as divided into nations, some of which have, at certain 
periods, tried to establish a hegemony over others, without ever achieving permanent success” 
(Renan, 1995).​ ​According to this argument, under powerful empires such as the Romans and the 
Ottomans, one's national identity was not important. You could be Arab, Greek, Jew, or Persian 
but if you lived within the confines of one of these grand empires that was not the first thing you 
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were. You first and foremost a were Roman, or Ottoman, or any one of the many empires that 
has been buried by the sands of time. Your nationhood did not matter because it didn't exist. It is 
superseded by one’s citizenship. Renan goes further in explaining that nations are a modern 
phenomenon and were the offspring of great dynasties of the past.  
The confusion surrounding this argument however relates to how a nation is properly 
derived and made into its own sovereign governing entity. Theorists such as Renan have laid out 
five things in which a nation, and therefore nationalism, are based on. They include: race, 
language, religion, geopolitical interests, and geography. However all of these could be very 
easily disregarded. Language and race, for example, are something constructed by humans, 
which flatten one's identity. But many states have multitudes of races living within their borders 
with just as many languages being spoken. While some claim all Arabs are the same race and 
that there are no subgroups, in actuality there are so many dialects within the Arab language that 
it is extremely difficult for conversions to carry over with ease.  
Renan continues to layout nationalisms fundamental principles with explaining the 
concept of religion within nationalist thought. Religion is something that supersedes nationhood, 
with the empires of the ancient world being made up of a plethora of religious groups, it was 
never used as a way for one to distinguish themselves from their home (at least not until recently 
according to some scholars). Geopolitical interests are more of a regional focus rather than a 
national one which finally leads to geography. Geography, specifically the concept of borders for 
modern states, is something artificially constructed in order for a state to succeed and reaffirm 
state sovereignty by giving state actors physical boundaries to oversee and protect, this 
co-existing ownership of land and space. Empires used to expand and conquer land without 
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always setting borders for centuries. This stopped with the fall of the most recent empire, the 
Ottomans. 
Particularly after the end of World War I, the Middle East was broken up and distributed 
amongst the European colonial powers. This is truly the origin of the modern problem facing 
Palestinians today. Many of the states in the Middle East have at least one straight line as a 
border (where British and French politicians drew their property lines), showing the heavy 
influence that economic greed had on the division of land. Over time this created countries that 
people began to feel pride for and they demonstrated that pride through nationalistic movements 
which included specific group songs, dances, dialects, and other things that further divided Arabs 
from one another. This was not something that was common during the era of the Ottoman 
empire. Arabs were divided by their specific geopolitical governantes, but under Ottoman rule, 
clan and tribal groups were the dominate civil ruling body of the region. A major example of this 
is the Hashemites, who later became rulers of countries such as Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. 
The idea of state nationalism emerged in the Middle East after these countries were already 
divided. This forged strained relationships that did not necessarily exist in the Ottoman 
controlled Middle East. In fact, Nasser tried to rectify the new nationalism of budding Arab 
states with Pan-Arabism by reminding Arabs of the pre-existent idea of a unified Arab kingdom 
promised to Sherif Hussein in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of 1916. While the 
phenomenon of a unified Arab people did emerge in the Middle East, the idea of Pan-Arabism 
never lasted. Arguably, the West were the ones who clung to this idea long after the push for 
Arab nationalism had already died down. 
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Palestinian nationalism has been a unique form of Arab nationalism insofar as that most 
Palestinians do not live inside the current borders of the state of Israel. Some would say that most 
Palestinians do not even live inside the land mass bordered by the Jordanian River to the east and 
the Mediterranean Sea to the west. Predominantly Palestinian nationalism largely grew out of 
communities living in refugee camps where they were influenced by Nasser’s call for Arab 
unity. From 1948 onward Palestinians who live inside the state of Israel, from 1967 onward from 
those within the Occupied Territories have faced heavy forms of punishment for displays of 
nationalism. The young men who are arrested for making displays of Palestinian patriotism are 
often beaten on site, thereafter taken to prisons where they are tortured and beaten further in 
order for the Israeli military to obtain information about their political enemies. While other 
states use flags and pictures of their rulers as demonstrations of their national pride, Palestinians 
most often use the pictures of dead young men, pictures of their leaders (usually those of 
Al-Fatah or others), and different forms of their flag to show that they are just as nationalistic as 
those who have a state of their own. The fact that they use the pictures of dead young men 
illustrates how men are still able to assert their political identity after they are dead. They 
become the martyrs and symbols of the ​qadiyyah​  and are therefore able to affirm their political 
influence, identity, and nationalism while becoming a source of identity and symbolism for the 
rest of their people. 
 
2.5 Arab Masculinity and Palestinian Identity 
“Masculinity” has different meanings. One overall idea is predominantly that: men are 
protectors and providers. As stated previously, Arab masculinity involves specific cultural 
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elements that must be adhered to in order for a boy to transform into a man. If these steps are not 
followed, or the boy shames himself in some way, he will never be able to become fully 
masculine and be viewed as a man in the community. A boy must obtain ​‘aql ​ and ​sharaf​   by 
protecting their ​wajh, ​ family, culture and community as they grow up and learn important 
lessons of respect and honor from daily life events such as schooling, marriage, and having 
children. In neighboring Arab states, establishing masculinity is easy and the community is able 
to establish who their leaders are (Peteet, 2013). These leaders are typically older men, who have 
acquired ​‘aql ​ and ​sharaf ​ and have defended it well throughout their adult life. They are viewed 
as men of great wisdom and political importance and their identity is known to them, their 
family, and the rest of the community. 
This is not the case in Palestinian communities across the globe. Whether it be 
Palestinians who live in Occupied Territories, refugee camps, abroad or in Israel itself, 
masculinity manifests differently in their reality. Living under military occupation (or under a 
colonial power) creates a structure in which men are lost and must find themselves (Fanon,1967). 
The power structure within the community of Palestinians is turned on its head because the 
colonizing military power--Israel--targets not the traditional community leaders, but rather 
younger men. Young men are seen as a greater threat to Jewish Israelis due to their physical 
vibrancy, as well as the importance that they hold for their family’s  honor and prosperity 
(Peteet, 2013). The older men’s responsibility of protecting their family and honor is stripped 
away from them by their oppressors when these young men are harmed.  Therefore, according to 
the common definition of Arab masculinity, these men are robbed of this crucial portion of their 
identity. Older men are no longer men in the eyes of the Arab community. The role of 
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masculinity is thrust upon their sons, nephews, and grandchildren because they are the ones who 
became the targets.  The young men protect their relatives from harm by being the ones putting 
themselves into harm's way.  
The young men take on the social and political importance that the older men previously 
acquired.  Instead of acquiring it long term, through life events and proving oneself, Palestinian 
boys acquire it through physical confrontation.  The young men know that their fathers and elder 
males cannot protect them from violence, as had been their role before. The young men believe 
that since they are unable to go to school or help their elders, they should instead become active 
in challenging the Israeli occupation, paying the price with their bodies.  
Contrary to Fanon, those such as Renan believe that they do not need to be the ones to 
engage in physical violence in order to affirm themselves and their identity. They are still able to 
engage in the formation of their own identity, due to meeting violence head on. Doing this they 
are able to start a resistance against those who have ruled over them. This creates a new right of 
passage that occurs outside of one's kinfolk, rendering the community and its older male leaders 
useless. The trauma to the masculine identity of Palestinian men is passed down generationally, 
from father to child. Men, who normally when they age become community leaders, see their 
leadership roles going to their sons and grandsons. They see their worth in the community 
disappear, they can no longer protect their children like their fathers could not protect them and 
they are forced to watch helplessly as their son's face the Israeli military, praying that their sons 





 One's identity is built upon several different factors. This is necessary in ensuring that a 
person's identity not to be flattened by global perceptions. Palestinian identity was established 
after the forced migration of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian people during ​Al-Nakba,​  and 
this identity has transformed into that of a warrior and a leader throughout generations of 
Palestinian men. The identity of these men is complex yet distorted, and much different than 
their Arab counterparts due to the vast influences of colonialism in Israel-Palestine. Social 
injustices and the total disregard of human rights within the state by Israeli state actors such as 
the military and its politicians are only a few of the things that distort the identity of Palestinian 
men in this active occupation. Nationalism and Arab masculinity have added more complex 
layers to the concept of Palestinian male identity.  Through the development of young 
Palestinian leadership and their identities, these young men also figure out how to face their 













Chapter 3-Methodology  
 
Chapter 3.1 Outline of Research 
In an effort to be more thorough, my research combined several different methods in 
order to capture the identity of Palestinian men and their narrative in an integrated manner.  I 
used a legal analysis of international documents, which were useful in analyzing the legal issues 
surrounding the conflict. I also utilized qualitative data retrieval methods by conducting in depth 
interviews with members of the Palestinian community living  in the Greater San Francisco Bay 
Area. My subjects were Palestinian men of predominantly Christian or Catholic faith that I 
reached through different community groups such as churches, the Ramallah Club, the Arab 
Cultural and Community Center directory, as well as through word of mouth.  
Compiling research was slightly more difficult than originally thought, particularly due to 
the controversial nature of this topic. While there are many credible and academically sound 
sources to reference in regards to the conflict itself, I had to sort through a large number of 
openly biased work to create an argument that is less skewed. While most academic work does 
demonstrate the author's opinion to an extent that can be filtered out; however it was still 
extremely difficult to remain neutral as I wrote.  Listening to the narratives of my research 
subjects while uncovering the history and narratives of both sides of the conflict presented a 
significant challenge for me to remain unbiased. I had to free myself and my mind from the 
passion these voices generated within me in order to write something that would honor the 
sacrifice made by both sides for. This was the only way I could adequately represent the young 
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men whose lives were cut short without the opportunity to define their own sense of political 
identity. 
 
3.2 Interview Overview and Setup 
 I interviewed Palestinian men who lived in Israel-Palestine during key generational 
shifts.  These men were either forced to leave or fled when they came of age or were graduating 
from their final year of high school. The use of  “of age” in this context refers to being eighteen 
or turning eighteen. They were informed that their actual names would not be used within my 
research in accordance with IRB protocol at the University of San Francisco. The interviews 
were all transcribed by hand with no voice recordings and reviewed by the interviewee before 
being saved on an encrypted external drive that is protected by several passwords. The 
interviews were conducted equally in Arabic and English due to the fact that many of  my 
subjects switched  back and forth between languages when answering my questions. I translated 
their Arabic to  English. 
 The interviews were done with the intention to identify the changing identity through the 
generations involved in the conflict. Each generation was broken down and analyzed through key 
events that broadly defined what it meant to be a Palestinian male at the time. I divided my 
interviewees into the following four generations: The 1948 or ​Al Nakba ​ generation from 
1948-1960, the ​Al Naksa ​ generation from 1961-1981, the ​First Intifada ​ generation from 
1982-1999, and the ​Second Intifada ​ generation from 2000 to 2016. I acknowledge that the 
generational break up is arguably problematic. For example, the ​Al Nakba ​ generation consists of 
a twelve year time frame while the following generation is twenty years time. I did this 
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purposely to encompass a group of men together in one group that would have a similar narrative 
and therefore a similar identity. These events are important in the development of Palestinian 
identity and changed the perception of Palestinian political identity for young Palestinian men.  
 
3.3 Logistical Issues 
 In the early stages of my thesis issues arose with my IRB application. After submitting 
my initial IRB application in early June it was denied with the reviewer stating my research 
project was outside my capability, suggesting ultimately that I should change the object of my 
thesis. After receiving an email from the head of the IRB at the University of San Francisco 
stating that the reviewer’s response was inappropriate,  a second application was submitted. By 
the time I received approval to commence with interviews it was well into the end of September 
and my time was limited. I was able to arrange interviews quickly due to preexisting connections 
with the Arab community in the Greater San Francisco Bay Area, but it was still challenging. 
 I originally intended to have two interviews per generation group however the two 
Intifada ​ groups proved challenging for a number of reasons. One of those reasons had to do with 
the issues I faced with the IRB. Due to my limited timeline it was incredibly challenging to work 
with their schedules.  Ultimately both interviewees and I agreed that they may not be the best 
options for me due to my limited time. Because of  this setback I was unable to find others to 
substitute for those two interviews and therefore had to change my strategy. Other reasons for 
this change in strategy will be explained in the next section. 
 




I conducted interviews for several reasons.  The first and main reason for the interviews 
was to show the trend of how the physical representation of the Palestinian political identity has 
transformed through the community’s eyes, using their own words. While compiling and 
analyzing data and theory is beneficial and necessary, it is in my opinion the most efficent way to 
examine the impact of my thesis on the community itself. These interviews focused on how 
Palestinian men defined themselves by using the events that occurred in their youth to 
understand how their identities developed. By exploring these interviews I was able to establish a 
linear progression of the identity of Palestinian men. Based on my analysis, I broke up my 
interviewees into generational groups. Establishing these groups was key in identifying shifts in 
meaning for the physical body terms of Palestinian identity.  
These groups; the ​Al Nakba​ , the​ Al Naksa​ , the ​First Intifada​  and the ​Second Intifada 
generations all have different self-understandings of their identity distinct from one generation to 
the next. Due to the extreme shifts in the environment surrounding the conflict, Palestinian men 
felt they had no choice but to constantly change the meaning of their identity. Palestinian males 
transformed their identities due to their interactions with the state of Israel changing and 
becoming increasingly more violent than previous generations. After breaking up the 
intervewees into their appropriate generation groups, I wrote down my own expectations of what 
each generation’s interpretation of their identity was going to be.  While many frown upon this 
type of tactic, due to me potentially thrusting my own interpretation on my subjects, I found it 
extremely helpful to do this. While hypothesizing how each generation was going to summarize 
their identity, I chronologically ordered events of the conflict and the overall emotion of the 
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Palestinian people following those major events. By doing this I was able to come up with a 























Generation Group Hypothesized Trend 
Al Nakba Generation (1948-1960) ● Feels more guilt and regret.  
● Feels more responsibility for what 
happened.  
● A sense of upset and sorrow. Were not 
able to prevent “outsiders” from 
coming into their lands in the first 
place. 
● Deep hurt and sense of loss. More 
connection to their birth city than the 
country as a whole. 
Al Naksa Generation (1961-1981) ● More anger than sorrow. 
● Wording their identity is more rooted 
overtly in nationalism. 
● Not Physically but verbally violent in 
how they frame their identity in 
regards to who they see as an enemy, 
Jewish Israelis.  
● Feel a sense of loss and displacement 
and a fear of being uprooted while 
always feeling anxious. 
First Intifada Generation (1982-1999) ● Began to think more about the 
political environment they live in. 
● Began to become more involved.  
● The methods used against them were 
more violent so they are more guarded 
and prideful of what they went 
through.  
● Assert their identity very aggressively 
and proudly. 
Second Intifada Generation (2000-Present) ● More aware of the tools like Twitter 
that are at their disposal. 
● Prideful of their identity but bitter. 
● More understanding of the political 
climate. 
● More global in their understanding of 
the conflict. 
● Put more substance in educating 
themselves and the community. 
● Realize that fighting is not the answer 
to their struggle. 
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Chart A. Hypothesized summaries of each generation's identity. 
After I generated what I thought would be the basics of what these men would tell me 
about their identity, began my interviews. I used several community connections  to begin 
interviews with the men from the first two generation groups. I later used word of mouth to 
connect with the last two generation groups. However these two groups proved more difficult to 
acquire interviewees than the older two generations.  
 
3.4a-My Problems and Assumptions 
I had initially thought that the two older generation groups would prove to be more 
difficult mostly due to the factor of their age. I felt that particularly the ​Al Nakba ​ generation 
would either not remember most of what happened, feel unwilling to explain their identity to a 
young woman, or would be deceased. Yet that was quickly proven false. The ​Al Nakba 
generation was actually the most eager to speak with me and tell me about how they define what 
it means to be Palestinian. They wanted to tell me their stories and used the interview as a way to 
release themselves from their guilt by showing how much they still care about a land that they 
were forced to leave decades ago by relaying their identity to me in hopes that this thesis can 
help the younger generations of Palestinian men.  
Both ​Intifada​  generation groups proved the most difficult to acquire interviews from for 
numerous reasons. The ​First Intifada​ , in which Rabin implemented his “bone breaking” policies 
regarding protesters, scarred this particular generation in a way that I did not anticipate. While 
the men I talked to did not undergo torture or detention at the hands of the state of Israel and its 
 
59 Dayyat 
actors, many did and are not as eager to speak of the events that transpired due to the fear that 
still lingers in them to this day. 
The ​Second Intifada ​ generation posed a different issue altogether. Since I stated in my 
interview guidelines that I was not going to interview men who did not come of age in Palestine 
at the time of their leaving, I inherently restricted myself in who I could interview. Many of the 
men of this generation group have barely reached thirty years old. Some had left Palestine years 
before they were of age or did not even reside in Israel-Palestine at all. Those who did live there 
before immigrating were either not of age when they left or not of age currently. I was ultimately 
able to conduct one interview a piece in each ​Intifada ​ group as well as two interviews for each of 
the first two groups (i.e. the ​Al Nakba ​ and ​Al Naksa ​ generations). For the first two groups I 
utilized published accounts on both ​Intifadas ​ from works like ​Occupied Voices ​ by Wendy 
Pearlman and ​Palestine Speaks​  by Cate Malek and Mateo Hoke in order to compensate for the 
lack of a second interview. 
 
3.4b- Hypothesized Patterns Versus Actual Patterns 
 The pattern that I established in my initial hypothesis rang true with three exceptions. 
The first exception related to the ​Al Naksa ​ generation, who had two polar opposite sub-groups. 
While a lot of the wording used by this generation group is rooted in nationalism, violent 
rhetoric, and anger, there are some within that group who see the idea of nationalism as a tool to 
aid the state of Israel in their mission to eradicate the history of the Palestinian people. The 
second point in which my hypothesis did not match up after conducting the interviews was the 
nature of the ​First Intifada ​ group’s sensitivity to the topic of identity as well as their hesitancy to 
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talk about the issue of identity in terms of  Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I thought that due to the 
political and activist nature of the ​First Intifada​  this generation group would be more willing to 
share their interpretation of what Palestinian political identity is. However, while my 
interviewee, who was given the code 519JifflehDB, was forthcoming regarding information 
about the conflict itself, it was harder for him to articulate to me what his identity was and what 
it meant in relation to the conflict. For example he balked at one of my questions in which I 
asked him to give me the top six words he uses to formulate his Palestinian identity. He 




Chart B. Six words used by subject 519JifflehDB to describe his identity 
Many of these words seemed repetitive, but he then explained their meanings. They were 
more emotionally rooted than I anticipated. The two that stuck out the most, however were 
“fearless” and “courage”. These words are synonyms and when he saw my confused expression 
519JifflehDB elaborated. He explains that in regards to the word “fearless” he was referring to 
all Palestinians in general stating, “When you grow up in occupation throwing rocks, you’re not 
scared of anything” (519JifflehDB, 2016). When elaborating on the word “courage” he stated 
that it is something that as a Palestinian you must be raised with; it has to be a word that you 
associate with your identity. I took this to mean that one needs a certain brand of courage to 
survive as a member of this specific generation, where state sanctioned violence was more 




Military occupation and its influence on these men’s Palestinian identities was very 
obvious from speaking with them. 519JifflehDB was a teenager at the beginning of the ​First 
Intifada​ . He came of age during this uprising but instead of engaging in normal activities and 
partying with his friends, he was throwing stones, burning tires, and trying to get by without 
being beaten and arrested by Israeli police. One word I can associate with the Palestinian identity 
here is “guarded”. Palestinians are weary on the issue mostly out of the fear of being arrested and 
never coming home. In comparison to my subject from the ​Second Intifada, ​ 1419JifflehC* who 
happened to be related to 519JifflehDB, this guardedness made the ​First Intifada​  generation look 
angry and paranoid, though that is truly not the case. 1419JifflehC* has access to tools like social 
media and education that were not previously available. In fact 519JifflehDB’s generation 
developed these tools for the ​Second Intifada ​ generation group and 1419JifflehC* utilized it to 
his full advantage, something I’m sure many men from the ​Second Intifada​  did. 
The final piece of information from my interviews that did not match up with my 
hypothesis was the reaction of the first generation group, the ​Al Nakba ​ group to having an 
opportunity to be interviewed. While my initial hypothesis of finding those who were still alive 
and remember the events of 1948 was indeed difficult, their willingness to talk was unexpected. 
In fact, this generation was the most forthcoming with information not laced with malice or 
prejudice. They wove a tale but were candid where needed, such as calling those who they view 
as enemies by the term Zionist. By using this word, those interviewed in this generation were 
acknowledging the differences between the general population who practice Judaism and those 
who practice what to them is the colonial power of the Zionist government. In the end, I was able 
to flesh out the following pattern of identity for each generation group: 
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Generation Group Actualized Trend 
Al Nakba Generation (1948-1960) ● While wrought with guilt, forth 
coming with information. 
● Upset by the events that transpired, 
but hopeful for the future. 
● Family centered, protective. 
● Very specific in who they identify as 
being their enemy. 
Al Naksa Generation (1961-1981) ● Two polar opposite views on 
nationalism and how it affected the 
Palestinian people. 
● More scared and vulnerable in terms 
of their identity.  
● Skittish and extremely cynical when 
addressing the issues of Palestine and 
identity. 
First Intifada Generation (1982-1999) ● Protective of their identity, guarded. 
● Prideful and more politically aware.  
● Rhetoric used was more political and 
based in activism. 
● Sounding more educated than 
previous generations when speaking 
specifically of the issue of 
Israel-Palestine in relation to their 
identity. 
Second Intifada Generation (2000-Present) ● Prideful and educated.  
● Education has become a way to 
connect to their identity 
● Open-mindedness that was not present 
in previous generations. 
● More aware of the world and global 
affairs as a whole.  
Chart C. Actualized Summaries of each generation’s identity 
These observations became the basic definitions of identity for each generation that I was 
able to synthesize from the interviews. These summaries were much more detailed and layered 
than I initially hypothesized especially when regarding the ​Al Naksa ​ group. This group in 
 
63 Dayyat 
particular had opposing views on nationalism in comparison to what I originally thought. I 
hypothesized that due to the growing movement of Arab nationalism led by Nasser in Egypt that 
this generation would believe more in the idea of defining oneself through nationalist pride. I 
saw that this is not the case from the interviews I conducted.  
3.4c- The “Al Nakba Generation 
The generation I was most excited to interview and analyze was the ​Al Nakba ​ generation 
for a number or reasons. This was the generation where the conflict itself began. These men are 
the ones who began the journey of redefining what it means to be Palestinian. The beaten 
physical body of young Palestinian men began with this generation and their fight against Zionist 
colonialism. I was able to conduct two interviews from this time frame and was able to observe 
different parts of their identity that took root in later generations. You also get something 
extremely unique from their perspective. This generation possesses an identity that existed 
before the beaten body of a Palestinian boy ever entered the public consciousness. The two 
gentlemen I interviewed also gave me a wider perspective due to the their age difference and 
region of origin, both vastly different than my own. One of my subjects was approximately eight 
years younger than the other and from what is known as the West Bank, while  the older subject 
was from Jerusalem. These differences gave me a broader perspective on how each region of 
Israel-Palestine was affected by this abrupt shift of identity. 
The subjects from this generation, known as 52JerusalemHD and 1120RamallahGF gave 
very different, but almost predictable answers for the regions that they were from. 
52JerusalemHD was more passionate about his responses.  This subject stated multiple times that 
he was a nationalist and refused to call the West Bank by anything other than the label Palestine, 
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stating that he would not change the name of the greatest place in the world. There was also fear 
and guilt that surrounded many of his answers. When describing his initial leaving of Palestine as 
well as leaving Jordan years later to venture to America, he described a loss that words do not do 
justice. He looked me in the eye with an almost cynical smile and stated that leaving at those 
times to come to the United States is similar to dying to your family. His initial leaving was just 
as painful. Believing that the fighting was going to be short lived, he and his family packed as if 
for a holiday to visit their family in Bethlehem, only to never be able to return. 1120RamallahGF 
was different.  Much  of the fighting did not reach the West Bank and while he felt a lot of the 
similar pain that 52JerusalemHD felt, it was not as intense. He did not feel that same need to be 
more politically involved and pass down this identity to his children and the 
Palestinian-American youth, as my first subject did. Much like my first subject, he pushed for 
educating the young and encouraged them to embrace their identity as well as welcome questions 
from those who may not be Palestinian at all. 1120RamallahGF uses his first name as a way to 
begin discussions with people he meets about the conflict. He fondly states that his name is of 
unique and of strong Palestinian origin that it gets people to ask him where he is from, from there 
he is able to begin a conversation. 
 
3.4d- The “Al Naksa” Generation 
While one subject did demonstrate a more muted level of nationalism than I expected, the 
other was totally opposed to the idea of nationalism and connecting it with his identity. The 
subject in question who was given the code 146JerusalemGA to protect his identity reared back 
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and began to explain that while he was prideful of his identity, he cannot say that nationalism 
defines him. He instead used the word patriotism, explaining that it was more appropriate.  
The other gentleman in his group, 711JerusalemGA, broke down his identity in a more 
dissected matter stating that his identity was extremely turbulent even now: 
Something about being Palestinian is that we have this deep sense of 
uprootedness. It is hard to move from one thing to the other, I have a basic need to 
be permanent somewhere, even if I have to compromise on certain aspects of my 
life...Our identity did not come ready-made. I remember asking my brother “Am I 
Jordanian or Palestinian?” “Why is forbidden to say I am Palestinian?”. We were 
discouraged to mention our identity through the 50s. I remember picking up 
rations with my mom. We could not say we were Palestinian with full voices 
(711JerusalemGA,2016). 
 
I expected more violent rhetoric from the ​Al Naksa ​ generation, however their 
overwhelming depression and sadness was something that was not anticipated. I knew that there 
would be upset; this is a conflict that is tearing apart families and destroying lives on both sides, 
but it is still unique to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One of my subjects, 711JerusalemGA, and 
his story was even more so saddening as he explained why this fear of violence and being 
uprooted is totally justifiable to these men. When I asked 711JerusalemGA about his last visit to 
Palestine he described something horrific that is a genuine fear and reality to these young men. 
The fact that he was able to recite his ordeal to me was nothing short of a miracle to many. In the 
summer of 2015, 711JerusalemGA attempted to fly into Tel Aviv accompanied by a priest from 
the local Arab Catholic Church Community (ACCC) to visit family that he had not seen in 
decades. He never made it out of the airport and was detained and jailed for several days before 
showing up in SFO severely dehydrated with only his backpack. He recalls being called names, 
told that his American passport was not going to help him because he was Palestinian, and that 
the passport changed nothing.  
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This is a common phenomenon that Palestinian people faced according to academics such 
as Rashid Khalidi in his book ​Palestinian Identity. ​ Their identity is a marker for special 
treatment according to Khalidi. While this treatment can be viewed as an inconvenience to those 
who have a sense of belonging, this is the reality for those like 711JerusalemGA and is strongly 
reflected in the overall analysis of this generation. 
Overall these interviews provided insight into the heavy effect of military occupation and 
the fear of violence on one’s identity. While each group has a way that they identify themselves, 
the feeling of anxiety, uprootedness, and anger still lingers. The feelings resulting from this 
conflict leave Palestinian men with a turbulent and unstable political identity that they have yet 
















4.1 Conclusion Summary 
 
At the beginning of this paper I stated my thesis quite clearly. I wrote that the political 
identity of Palestinian men developed in a peculiar fashion due to factors such as violent 
interactions with the state of Israel, torture, colonialism, and the concept of masculinity. The 
identity of Palestinian men stems from these elements due to the fact that they have become 
highly politicized beings, more so than almost any other group of people in the world. Their very 
existence is viewed as a threat to an entire group of people to the point that the state of Israel and 
its actors label all of them as dangerous and does everything in their power to eradicate that 
threat. The phenomenon of a male Palestinian political identity is seen as a huge danger to the 
state of Israel for one very simple reason. Israel’s enemies are not being erased, instead the 
people of Palestine are transforming into something stronger and more cohesive than ever before. 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict still remains a hot button issue in the Middle East as well 
as internationally. The political identity of young Palestinian men is used as a tool for both sides 
of the conflict. For Israel, their state actors, and their supporters, the Palestinian men and their 
highly politicized nature is seen as the enemy, one that can be dealt  with by means of mass 
detentions and state sanctioned violence. For the Palestinian people it gives them a physical 
representation of what they are, and someone to look to for the future of their struggle. While 
they have been fighting for almost seventy years for their own state and freedom from military 
occupation, they have unknowingly (or possibly knowingly) created something much more 




Analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its history and its ramifications on Palestinians, 
allows one to observe the political identity of these Palestinian men and the lingering damage 
this conflict has had on their lives, whether it be those who still live in Israel-Palestine or those 
who immigrated decades before. This identity and its transformation throughout generations has 
played such a large role in how the conflict has progressed and will continue to progress in the 
coming years. The Palestinian people as a whole went through years of imperial and colonial 
rule, not truly having an identity of their own. They were first Ottoman, then British, and finally 
enemies in a state that wants to erase them. One common misconception about the identity of 
these young men and Palestinian people in general is that they did not come into an identity of 
their own until the 1960s, in which Pan-Arab nationalism was rampant in the region.  This does 
two things: it disregards the  memories and narratives of those who came before the generation 
of the sixties, those from the mandate period and those from ​Al Nakba. ​ What it also does is 
ignore the complex genesis of the identity of these young men, an identity that took decades and 
decades to form and manifest into a physical representation (Khalidi, 1997).  
The very process of how these men formed their identities speaks volumes about how the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is unfolding and how and whether a solution to the issues at hand will 
be found. These young men, and the generations before them shaped their identities through 
interacting with the state of Israel and its actors in violent ways. The primary way the state and 
these men interact is through bullets, stones, illegal detentions, and beatings, which of course 




However, this also creates a parallel identity filled with pride, power, patriotism, and 
sacrifice which these young men make for the struggle of their people. This pride has not died 
down no matter the level of violence and push back that they face from Israel, their state actors, 
and its international backers. These young Palestinian men have more tools at their disposal than 
ever before, such as Twitter, blogs, and Youtube. They can reach millions of Palestinians and 
non-Palestinians internationally in a matter of seconds and explain their political identities 
through a non-government platform.  
Now that the political identity of these young men is starting to be recognized by 
the international community in a more official way, their identity is more important than ever 
before. One example of this would be finally obtaining a level of international recognition. On 
November 29th 2012 Palestine and the Palestinian Authority was finally declared a 
“non-member observer state” in the United Nations which demonstrates a ​de facto​  recognition of 
the state of Palestine, and therefore their political identity (BBC, 2012).​  ​This is a huge step 
forward due simply to the fact that now the international community is moving toward 
recognizing the identity of Palestinian men and the Palestinian community in general.  
They have more power internationally as well as within the state of Israel. Palestinian 
men no longer just have to rely on their bodies to fight for their identities. They have all of these 
resources as well as the ear of the international community and their recognition as a tool, 
something that they did not have in the generations prior to 2012. It will be interesting how the 
later half of the ​Second Intifada​  generation and the generations following define their identities 
in the future. Will they be more educated? Hopeful? Pragmatic? Or will they finally be able to 
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say that they are Palestinian without the anxiety of previous generations clouding their thoughts 
and feelings.  
 
4.2 Hopes for the Future 
While being recognized as a non-member observer state is a huge step forward for the 
Palestinian people and the recognition of the identity of these young men in particular, there is 
still a long way to go. These young men still interact with the state of Israel in a predominantly 
violent way. With all the checkpoints and security permit issues paired with almost hourly arrests 
and land confiscations, Palestinians are fearful to leave their homes due to the very real 
possibility of being arrested for simply being Palestinian. The Palestinian Authority President 
Mahmoud Abbas and others must insist on a ceasefire on both sides in order for those who wish 
for peace to be able to work on achieving that peace. Coalition groups such as Combatants for 
Peace (a coalition peace group consisting of both former Israeli military and Palestinian guerrilla 
combatants) and others have to create safe environments for these young men to express and 
develop their identities safely without fear of being arrested, tortured, and beaten.  
The state of Israel must also be held accountable for its actions against the Palestinian 
people. This is not to say that illegal actions by Palestinian people and radical groups should be 
ignored. On the contrary, these groups should also be held accountable for their actions as well. 
This would demonstrate a sense of equality between the two conflicting identities that will help 
heal decades of mistrust. The state of Israel is being protected by powerful countries such as the 
United States because they serve an economic neo-colonial purpose. Israel has disobeyed 
countless United Nations resolutions and continues to break international law by jailing, 
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torturing, and restricting the rights of Palestinian communities and are not being held 
accountable for their actions. This must change in order to fully recognize the identities of not 
only living Palestinian men, but those who died for the struggle and for those who died not really 
knowing what their identities meant on the global stage.  
I try to remain optimistic in terms of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a solution being 
found. There has been tremendous progress made in the past decade with people becoming 
increasingly aware of the situation. This global awareness has opened many different doors for 
Palestinian men (and the people as a whole) to develop and share their political identities in more 
positive and accepting environments.​ ​The state of Israel is being held accountable for their 
actions morally by humankind with every video, tweet, facebook post, and article published that 
demonstrates the brutality that these young Palestinian men face daily. I believe it is only a 
matter of time until legal accountability will follow. 
 The main point however is that now the Palestinian political identity is defined by more 
than just their  post ​Al Nakba ​ victimhood. It is defined by their strength, their patriotism, their 
endurance, and perseverance through all the hardships they have faced, and because of this 
Palestinian men have taken center stage in international politics in a way that they never have 
before. While many of my interviewees have stated that they may not see a Palestinian state in 
their lifetime, they remain hopeful and optimistic for the future. Their identities will live on and 
develop into something much stronger than generations before them, and those are the weapons 
that they will use against the Israeli tanks. They will no longer have to throw stones, instead they 
will use their passion, their words, and their message of unity and identity as their weapons and 
one day a state of Palestine will be recognized, even if it takes another seventy years. 
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Appendix 1-Interview Questions 
 
1. When was the last time you were in Palestine?  
2. Where in Palestine is your family traditionally from? 
3. How would you describe your leaving Palestine? 
4. When I say the words “Palestine”, “nationalism and “identity”, what comes to mind? 
5. Can you list the first six words that you associate with your identity? 
6. What is the most important word that you would say encompasses your identity as a 
whole from the list you mentioned? 
7. Did you participate in any civil disobedience demonstrations in Palestine when you came 
of age?  
8. How did growing up in an active occupation change your perception of what it means to 
be Palestinian? 
9. Do you believe that you identify more with Palestine than those who have not been to 
Israel/Palestine? Why or why not? 
10. How do you compare your sense of identity to those who did not grow up in Palestine?  
11. Name three words that you feel you cannot associate with your identity. 







Appendix 2- Coding System 
 
 
The coding sequence to create names for my interviewees consisted of three main steps: 
1. Their first and last initials were transcribed from letters to their corresponding numbers 
from the standard English alphabet.  
a. I.e “A” is equal to the number one, etc.  
2. Then comes the area of Israel-Palestine that the interviewee and their families were 
originally from. This does not necessarily mean that this is the area from which they fled 
Israel-Palestine from. 
3. Their ages were documented and those individual numbers were transcribed to their 
corresponding numbers.  
a. I.e. Someone who is 25 years of age would have their age correspond to the code 
“BE”, due to the fact that “B” is equal to the number two and “E” is equal to the 
number 5. Anyone whose age ends in zero will have an asterix (*) in place of the 
number zero.  
The following is the number to letter code:  
 
(*)= 0 
A=  1 
B= 2 
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